























LEGAL RESTRICTIONS UPON WEAPONS 
AND METHODS EMPLOYED IN 
NAVAL WARFARE 
6oo SCOPE 
This chapter describes the legal limitations governing the employment 
of weapons and methods in naval warfare. The basic principles which 
apply in determining the legality of any weapon or method are stated in 
Section 2.2.0. 2 The rules governing the capture and destruction of vessels 
and aircraft are stated in Article 503. 
6Io WEAPONS 
The following articles examine the rules of international law governing 
mines and torpedoes; chemicals, gases, and bacteria; and nuclear weapons. 
6II MINES AND TORPEDOES 
The only restrictions laid down by a convention governing the bellig-
erent employment of mines and torpedoes are laid down in the Hague 
Convention No. VIII (I907 ). Articles I through 3 of this Convention 
read as follows: 
Article I. It is forbidden: 
r. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are 
so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person 
who laid them ceases to control them; 
2.. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become 
harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings; 
3· To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have 
missed their mark. 
Article 2.. It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast 
and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial 
shipping. 
Article 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, 
every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful 
shipping. 
The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these mines 
harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under sur-
veillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, 
by a notice addressed to ship-owners, which must also be communicated to 
the Governments through the diplomatic channel. 3 
(Footnotes at end of chapter) 
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6r2. CHEMICALS, GASES, AND BACTERIA 
a. CHEMICALS. Weapons of chemical types which are at times asphyxiat-
ing in nature, such as white phosphorus, smoke, and flame throwers, may 
be employed. 4 
b. GASES AND BACTERIA. The United States is not a party to any treaty 
now in force that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of poisonous or 
asphyxiating gases or of bacteriological weapons. 5 Although the use of 
such weapons frequently has been condemned by states, including the 
United States, 6 it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restric-
tion established by treaty, a state legally is prohibited at present from 
resorting to their use. 7 However, it is clear that the use of poisonous gas 
or bacteriological weapons may be considered justified against an enemy 
who first resorts to the use of these weapons. 8 
6r3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
There is at present no rule of international law expressly prohibiting 
states from the use of nuclear weapons in warfare. In the absence of 
express prohibition, the use of such weapons against enemy combatants 
and other military objectives is permitted. 9 
62.o BOMBARDMENT 
The term bombardment as used herein includes both aerial and naval 
bombardment. This section is not concerned with the legal limitations 
on land bombardment by land forces. 
62.r GENERAL LIMITATIONS ON BOMBARDMENT 
a. DESTRUCTION OF CITIES. The wanton destruction of cities, towns, or 
villages, or any devastation not justified by military necessity, is pro-
hibited.10 
b. NoNCOMBATANTS. Belligerents are forbidden to make noncombatants 
the target of direct attack in the form of bombardment, such bombardment 
being unrealted to a military objective. 11 However, the presence of non-
combatants in the vicinity of military objectives does not render such 
objectives immune from bombardment for the reason that it is impossible 
to bombard them without causing indirect injury to the lives and property 
of noncombatants. In attetnpting to bombard a military objective, com-
manders are not responsible for incidental damage done to objects. in the 
vicinity which are not military objectives. 
c. TERRORIZATION. Bombardment for the sole purpose of terrorizing 
the civilian population is prohibited. 
d. UNDEFENDED CITIES. Belligerents are forbidden -to bombard a city 
or town that is undefended and that is open to immediate entry by own or 
allied forces. 12 
62.2. SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON BOMBARDMENT 
a. MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS, fixed or mobile, and vehicles of 
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wounded and sick or of medical equipment may not be bombarded or 
attacked; however, belligerents must ensure that such medical establish-
ments and units are, as far as possible, situated in such a manner that 
attacks against military objectives cannot imperil their safety. The pro-
tection afforded ceases if such establishments or units are used to commit 
harmful acts outside their humanitarian duties and when, after due warning 
has been given that the performance of harmful acts will remove protection, 
such warning has remained unheeded. The distinctive emblem-red cross, 
or red crescent, or the red lion and sun, on a white background-must be 
hoisted over medical establishments and units entitled to protection. 13 
b. SPECIAL HOSPITAL ZONES established by agreement among the bel-
ligerents are immune from bombardment provided that the conditions 
under which they are required to operate are continually observed. 14 
c. PROTECTED BUILDINGS. Buildings devoted to religion or to art or to 
charitable purposes, historic monuments, and the like should, as far as 
possible, be spared from bombardment on condition that they are not used 
at the same time for military purposes and are properly located (not near a 
military objective). It is the duty of inhabitants to indicate such places 
by distinctive and visible signs. This may be done by large, stiff, rec-
tangular panels divided diagonally into two triangular portions-the upper 
portion black, the lower portion white. There is however no requirement 
to observe these signs or any others indicating inviolability of buildings 
that are known to be used for military purposes. 15 
62.3 WARNING BEFORE BOMBARDMENT 
Where a military situation permits, commanders should make e\tery 
attempt to give prior warning of their intention to bombard a place so that 
the civilian population in close proximity will have an opportunity to seek 
safety. 16 
63o MEASURES OF MARITIME WARFARE AGAINST TRADE 
This section deals with the three principal measures of maritime warfare 
against trade: the control and capture of contraband, the imposition of 
blockade, and the capture or destruction of enemy property found at sea. 17 
631 CONTRABAND 
a. CHARACTER. Contraband consists of all goods which are destined for 
an enemy and which may be susceptible of use in war. Contraband goods 
are divided into two categories: absolute and conditional. Absolute 
contraband consists of goods which are used primarily for war (or goods 
whose very character makes them destined to be used in war). Con-
ditional contraband consists of goods which are equally susceptible of use 
either for peaceful or for warlike purposes. 18 
b. BELLIGERENT CONTRABAND DECLARATIONS. Upon the initiation of 
armed conflict, belligerents may declare contraband lists, setting forth 
therein the classification of articles to be regarded as contraband as well 
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as the distinction to be made between goods considered as absolute contra-
band and goods considered as conditional contraband. The precise nature 
of a belligerent's contraband list may vary according .to the particular 
circumstances of the armed conflict. 19 
C. CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND 
(I) Absolute Contraband. Goods consisting of absolute contraband are 
liable to capture if their destination is the territory belonging to or occupied 
by an enemy, or the armed forces of an enemy. It is immaterial whether 
the carriage of such goods is direct, or involves transshipment, or transport 
overland.20 In the case of absolute contraband a destination of territory 
belonging to or occupied by an enemy, or the armed forces of an enemy, is 
presumed to exist in the following circumstances: when the transporting 
vessel is to call at an enemy port before arriving at a neutral port for which 
the goods are documented; when goods are documented to a neutral port 
serving as a port of transit to an enemy, even though the goods are consigned 
to a neutral; and when goods are consigned .. to order," or to an unnamed 
consignee, but destined to a neutral state in the vicinity of enemy territory.21 
(2.) Conditional Contraband. Goods consisting of conditional contra-
band are liable to capture if des tined for the use of an enemy government or 
its armed forces. It is immaterial whether the carriage of such goods is 
direct, or involves transshipment, or transport overland. 22 
d. LIABILITY To CAPTURE. Vessels and aircraft carrying goods liable to 
capture as absolute or conditional contraband may be captured (see sub-
paragraph so3d (I). 23 However, liability to capture for carriage of contra-
band ceases once a vessel or aircraft has deposited the contraband goods. 24 
e. ExcEPTioNs To coNTRABAND. The following goods are exempt from 
capture as contraband: 
I. Free articles, i. e., goods not susceptible of use in war. 25 
2.. Articles intended exclusively for the treatm.ent of wounded and sick 
members of the armed forces, and for the prevention of disease. The 
particulars concerning the carriage of such articles must be transmitted 
to the adverse state and approved by it. 
3· Articles provided for by a convention (treaty) 26 or by special ar-
rangement as between the belligerents. 
632. BLOCKADE 27 
a. DEFINITION. A blockade is a belligerent operation intended to pre-
vent vessels of all states from entering or leaving specified coastal areas 
which are under the sovereignty, under the occupation, or under the con-
trol of an enemy. Such areas rna y include ports and harbors, the en tire 
coastline, or parts of it. 28 International law does not prohibit the exten-
sion of a blockade by sea to include the air space above those portions of 
the high seas in which the blockading forces are operating. 29 
b. EsTABLISHMENT. In order to be binding a blockade must be established 
by the belligerent government concerned. 30 A blockade may be declared 
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either by the government of the blockading state or by the commander of 
the blockading force acting on behalf of his government. The declaration 
should include the date the blockade begins, the geographical limits of the 
blockade, and the period granted neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the 
blockaded area. 31 
c. NoTIFICATION. It is customary for the blockade to be notified in a 
suitable manner to the governments of all states. The commander of the 
blockading force usually makes notification to lo~al authorities in the 
blockaded area. 32 
d. EFFECTIVENEss. A blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective. 
This means that a blockade must be maintained by a force sufficient to 
render ingress and egress to or from the blockaded area dangerous. 33 
e. LIMITS oF BLOCKADE. A blockade must not bar access to or departure 
from neutral ports or coasts. 34 
f. APPLICATION OF BLOCKADE. A blockade must be applied equally 
(impartially) to the vessels and aircraft of all states. 35 
g. BREACH OF BLOCKADE 
(1) Knowledge of the existence of a blockade is essential to the offenses of 
breach of blockade and attempted breach of blockade; presumed knowledge 
is sufficient. 36 
(2.) Breach of blockade is the passage of a vessel or aircraft through the 
blockade. 
(3) Attempted breach of blockade occurs from the time a vessel or aircraft 
leaves a port or air take-off point with the intent of evading the blockade. 
It is immaterial that the vessel or aircraft is at the time of visit bound to a 
neutral port or airfield, if its ultimate destination is the blockaded area, or 
if the goods found in its cargo are to be transshipped through the blockaded 
area. There is a presumption of attempted breach of blockade where 
vessels and aircraft are bound to a neutral port or airfield serving as a point 
of transit to the blockaded area. 37 
(4) Capture. Vessels and aircraft are liable to capture for breach of 
blockade and attempted breach of blockade (see subparagraph so3d2.). 
The liability of a blockade runner to capture begins and tenninates with 
her voyage or flight. If a vessel or aircraft has succeeded in escaping from 
a blockaded area, liability to capture continues until the completion of the 
voyage or flight. 38 
h. SPECIAL PRIVILEGES 
I. Neutral warships and neutral military aircraft have no pos1t1ve 
right of entry to a blockaded area. However, they may be allowed to 
enter or leave a blockaded area as a matter of courtesy. Permission to 
visit a blockaded area is subject to any conditions, such as the length of 
stay, that the senior officer of the blockading force may deem necessary 
and expedient. 
2.. Neutral vessels and aircraft in urgent distress may be permitted to 
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enter a blockaded area, and subsequently to leave it, under conditions 
prescribed by the commander to the blockading force. 
633 ENEMY PROPERTY 
a. ENEMY CHARACTER OF GOODS. The character of goods found on board 
a merchant vessel or aircraft is enemy if the commercial domicile of the 
owner is in territory belonging to or occupied by an enemy belligerent. 39 
All goods found on board enemy vessels or aircraft are presumed to be of 
enemy character in the absence of proof of their neutral character. 
b. ENEMY GOODS IN TRANSIT. Notwithstanding any transfer of title to 
enemy goods already at sea, these goods retain their enemy character. 
c. CAPTURE OF ENEMY GOODS. Goods possessing enemy character may 
be captured. However, enemy goods, contraband excepted, found in 
neutral vessels or aircraft, normally are not liable to capture. 40 
64o STRATAGEMS AND TREACHERY 41 
a. STRATAGEMS, or RUSES oF WAR, are legally permitted.42 In particular, 
according to custom it is permissible for a belligerent warship to use false 
colors and to disguise her outward appearance in other ways in order to 
deceive an enemy, provided that prior to going into action such warship 
shows her true colors. 43 
b. AcTs oF TREACHERY, whether used to kill, wound, or otherwise obtain 
an advantage over an enemy, are legally forbidden. 44 
641 IMPROPER USE OF DISTINCTIVE EMBLEMS 
The use of the red cross and other equivalent distinctive emblems must 
be limited to the indication and protection of hospital ships and other 
authorized medical craft, medical aircraft, medical units and establish-
ments, and medical personnel and materials. It is forbidden to use ships, 
aircraft and establishments protected by the distinctive emblem of the red 
cross or other equivalent distinctive emblems, for any military purpose. 45 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 
2 Unless restricted by customary or conventional international law, belligerents legally are 
permitted to use any means in conducting hostilities. Article 2.2. of the Regulations annexed 
to Hague Convention No. IV (I907), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
states: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not ·unlimited." 
This article, which refers to weapons and methods of warfare, is merely an affirmatinn that the 
means of warfare are restricted by rules of conventional (treaty) and customary international 
law. Although immediately directed to the conduct of land warfare, the principle embodied 
in Article 2.2. of the Hague Regulations is applicable equally to t~e conduct of naval warfare. 
Article 2.3 (e) of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. IV (I907) forbids bel-
ligerents: "To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." 
This provision is the application to weapons of the general rule, or principle, of humanity 
which prohibits the employment of any kind or degree of force not necessary for the purpose 
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of the war, i. e., for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources (see paragraph 2.2.ob ). 
However, the rule forbidding the use of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering 
does not extend to the use of explosives contained in projectiles, mines, rockets, hand grenades, 
and the like, where a military purpose is apparent and suffering, though unavoidable, is inci-
dental to the purpose of the war. The rule does apply to the use of irregular-shaped bullets, 
the use of projectiles filled with glass, the use of any substance on bullets that would tend un-
necessarily to inflame a wound inflicted by them, and to the scoring of the surface or the filing 
off of the ends of the hard cases of bullets. 
Finally, the principle of humanity places limitations upon the possible use to which weapons, 
otherwise lawful, may be put. Any weapon may serve an unlawful purpose, e. g., if used to 
cause unnecessary suffering or devastation not JUStified by military necessity. Hence, a dis-
tinction must be drawn between the legality of a weapon, irrespective of its possible use, and 
the legal limitations placed upon the possible use of any weapon. 
3 The qualifications contained in Articles 2. and 3 of Hague Convention No. VIII (1907) were 
sufficient to create, from the very start, serious doubt as to whether the spirit of this Convention 
as an instrument for providing for the security of peaceful shipping would ever in practice be 
observed. The experiences of World Wars I ·and II served to confirm the validity of these 
doubts. Still further, it is questionable whether or not these provisions (which apply specifi-
cally to torpedoes and to automatic, and anchored automatic, contact mines) can be considered 
as applicable to the newer types of mines (magnetic and acoustic) or to the use of aircraft for 
mine laying. 
4 It is equally permissible to use weapons employing fire, such as tracer ammunition, flame 
throwers and other incendiary instruments and projectiles. 
5 The most important of these treaties is the Protocol .. for the prohibition of the use in war 
of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare" signed 
at Geneva 17 June 192.5, on behalf of the United States and many other states. Although rati-
fied or adhered to by a considerable number of the signatories, and now effective between them, 
the 192.5 Protocol of Geneva was never ratified by the United States. The operative provisions 
of the Protocol obligate the contracting states not to use in war "asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and ... all analogous liquids, materials, or devices" and to extend this prohi-
bition ••to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare." Great Britain, France, the Soviet 
Union, and a number of other states signed subject to the reservations that the Protocol was 
to be binding only with respect to those states which ratified it and would cease to be binding 
with respect to those ratifying states which, in time of war, failed to respect the prohibitions 
contained in the Protocol. It should be noted that the 192.5 Protocol of Geneva forbids only 
the use in warfare of gases and bacteria, not the manufacture of such weapons. 
6 The United States has never used bacteriological weapons and has not used poisonous gases 
since World War I. During World War II President Roosevelt made the following statement 
in response to reports that one or more of the Axis Powers ··were seriously contemplating use of 
poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare'': 
.. Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. 
This country has not used them, and I hope that we never will be compelled to use them. I 
state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons 
unless they are :first used by our enemies." U.S. Naval War College, International Law Docu-
ments, I942 (1943), p. 85. 
7 Despite the frequent condemnation by states of poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons 
and the equally frequent claim that the use of such weapons must of necessity violate the pro-
hibition against using weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering (see Note 2. above) 
it is difficult to hold that the use of these weapons is prohibited to all states according to custom-
ary international law. At the same time, it does seem correct to emphasize that to the extent 
that. these weapons are used either directly upon the noncombatant population or in such 
circumstances as to cause unnecessary suffering their employment must be considered as unlawful. 
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tJ See Notes 5 and 6 above. Poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons may be used only 
if and when authorized by the President. 
11 The employment, however, of nuclear weapons is subject to the basic principles stated in 
Section 2.2.0 and Article 2.2.I. Also, see Articles 62.I and 62.2., as well as Note 2. above. Nuclear 
weapons may be used by United States forces only if and when directed by the President. 
1° The general limitations on bombardment enumerated in paragraphs 62.Ia and d are appli-
cations to bombardment of the basic principle of humanity (see paragraph 2.2.ob). 
11 The general limitations on bombardment enumerated in subparagraphs 62.Ib and c are 
applications to bombardment of the customary rule distinguishing between combatants and 
noncombatants (see Article 2.2.I). 
12 Articles I and 2. of Hague Convention No. IX (I907) Respecting Bombardment by Naval 
Forces in Time of War states: 
"Article I. The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwell-
ings, or buildings is forbidden. 
A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are 
anchored off the harbor. 
Article 2.. Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war 
materiel, workshops or plants which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or 
army, and the ships of war in the harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. 
The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons followed 
by a reasonable time of waiting, if all other means are impossible, and when the local authori-
ties have not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed. 
He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a bom-
bardment under such circumstances. 
If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no delay can be allowed the enemy, 
it is understood that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, as in the 
case given in paragraph I, and that the commander shall take all due measures in order that 
the town may suffer as little harm as possible." 
The provisions of Article 2. of Hague Convention No. IX (I907) are obviously inapplicable 
where the "undefended" locality is open to immediate entry by own or allied forces. 
''An open town proper! y so-called is one which is so complete! y undefended that the enemy 
may enter and take possession. Such a town is exempted from lawful bombardment, for 
in these circumstances bombardment would be contrary to the fundamental principle forbid-
ding destruction superfluous to military requirements. This rule does not apply to a town 
behind the front line, for it cannot properly be said to be either open or undefended, and the 
enemy, being unable to take possession of its military resources, must be allowed to attempt 
their destruction by bombardment from the air. Such bombardment is, however (apart from 
the question of reprisals), strictly limited to military objectives. Therefore, a town without 
military objectives would be exempt." R. Y. Jennings, "Open Towns," Vol. XXII, British 
Yearbook of International Law (I945), pp. 2.63-4. 
13 See Articles I9 and 2.I of the I949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick. Articles 42., 43, and 44 of this Convention deal with the distinctive 
emblem over medical establishments and units entitled to protection. 
"Article I9. Fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the MedicalSer.vice may in 
no circumstances be attacked, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties 
to the conflict. Should they fall into the hands of the adverse Party, their personnel shall 
be free to pursue their duties, as long as the capturing Power has not itself ensured the neces-
sary care of the wounded and sick found in such establishments-and units. 
The responsible authorities shall ensure that the said medical establishments and units 
are, as far as possible, situated in such a manner that attacks against military objectives 
cannot imperil their safety. 
Article 2.I. The protection to which fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the 
Medical Service are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their 
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humanitarian duties , acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after 
a due warning has been given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit, and 
after such warning has remained unheeded." 
14 Article 2.3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field provides for the establishment through agree-
ment of the Parties concerned of hospital zones and localities. A similar provision, though 
extended to include so-called "safety zones," is included in Article 14 of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. In the annex to 
each of these conventions, draft agreements relating to the establishment of these zones are 
provided. 
15 Article 5 of Hague Convention No. IX (1907) Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces 
in Time of War states: 
"Article 5. In bombardments by naval forces all the necessary measures must be taken by 
the commander to spare as far as possible sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, 
or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick or wounded 
are collected, on the understanding that they are not used at the same time for mihtary 
purposes. 
It is the duty of the inhabitants to indicate such monuments, edifices, or places by visible 
signs, which shall consist of large stiff rectangular panels divided diagonally into two coloured 
triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white.'' 
16 Article 6 of Hague Convention No. IX (1907) Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces 
in Time of War states: 
"Article VI. If the military situation permits, the commander of the attacking naval force, 
before commencing the bombardment, must do his utmost to warn the authorities." 
Article 2.7 of the regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. IV (1907) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land states: 
''Article XXVI. The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing 
the bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities." 
17 The principal aim of maritime warfare against trade is to shut off the trade of an enemy; 
that is, to prevent all imports to or exports from enemy territory by sea or by air over the sea, 
without regard to whether this trade is carried in enemy or neutral vessels or aircraft. 
18 "There are, in the first place, articles which by their very character are destined to be used 
in war. In this class are to be reckoned, not only arms and ammunition, but also such articles 
of ambiguous use as military stores, naval stores, and the like. These are termed absolute con-
traband. There are, secondly, articles which, by their very character, are not necessarily destined 
to be used in war, but which, under certain circumstances and conditions, can be of the greatest 
use to a belligerent for the continuance of the war. To this class belong, for instance, provisions, 
coal, gold, and silver. These articles are termed conditional or relative contraband • .. although 
belligerents must be free to take into consideration the circumstances of the particular war, 
as long as the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband is upheld it ought not 
to be left altogether to their discretion to declare any articles they like to be absolute contra-
band. The test to be applied is whether, in the special circumstances of a particular war, or 
considering the development of the means used in making war, the article concerned is by its 
character destined to be made use of for military, naval, or air-fleet purposes. If not, it ought 
to be declared absolute contraband. However, it may well happen that an article which is 
not by its very nature destined to be made use of in war, acquires this character in a particular 
war and under particular circumstances; and in such case it may be declared absolute contra-
band. Thus, for instance, foodstuffs cannot, as a rule, be declared absolute contraband; but if 
the enemy, for the purpose of securing sufficient (foodstuffs) for his military forces, takes 
possession of all the foodstuffs in the country, and puts the whole population on rations, food-
stuffs acquire the character essential to articles of absolute contraband, and can therefore~be 
declared to be such." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. II (7th ed.,~1952.), 
pp. 8o1-3. 
417 
According to the traditional law, the specific meaning attached to the concept of "hostile (or 
enemy) destination'' depends upon the nature or character of goods carried. Indeed, the real 
significance of the distinction made between absolute and conditional contraband becomes 
apparent only upon considering the destination required of either category in order to justify 
belligerent capture. In the case of absolute contraband, capture is justified if the goods are 
destined to territory belonging to or occupied by an enemy, or the armed forces of an enemy. 
The nature of absolute contraband makes it highly probable that a belligerent will appropriate 
such goods as long as they are anywhere within his jurisdiction. In the case of conditional 
contraband, capture is justified if the goods are destined for the use of an enemy government or 
its armed forces. The ambiguous character of conditional contraband is resolved when it is 
established that such goods are directly intended for military use by an enemy. Finally, goods 
which are not susceptible of use in war, i. e., so called "free goods," are not liable to capture 
by a belligerent. 
19 In view of the practices of belligerents during World Wars I and II it is difficult to estimate 
the extent to which the distinctions forming the basis of the traditional law of contraband, 
discussed in paragraph 631a and Note 18 above, still may be considered as valid. The categories 
of goods which are not susceptible of use in war are now extremely limited. During World 
Wars I and II, the practice of the belligerents was to treat as conditional contraband almost all 
goods which were formerly regarded as free. In addition, and much more important, the 
distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, although formally adhered to by 
most of the belligerents, came to have little, if any, real significance. The extensive control 
exercised by belligerents over all imports did not allow, in practice, a clear distinction to be 
made between goods destined to an enemy government, or its armed forces, and goods destined 
to the civilian population. The principal result of this extensive control exercised by bel-
ligerents over all imports was to consider goods as absolute contraband which had formerly 
been considered only as conditional contraband. The test of enemy destination, formerly 
applied only to a restricted number of articles constituting absolute contraband, came to be 
applied to all goods susceptible of u~e in war. Thus, one writer summarizes this experience of 
World Wars I and II as follows: 
''The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband dates from the time when 
armies were small, so that levies ... did not cause a reorientation of the belligerent's 
national life. Major wars of the present century are waged by nations in arms, with mobi-
lized manpower and pooled and rationed resources. Imports are controlled from the moment 
they land, even when they are not licensed and controlled in advance; and no clear distinction 
between destination of goods to military and to the civilian elements is maintainable. That 
distinction may still be important in localized conflicts; but its general importance is likely 
to become increasingly merely a point de depart for the drafting of more efficient belligerent 
regulations. By 1941 the British Crown was arguing before the prize court that it was not 
obliged to issue lists at all, and that, in relation to a totalitarian enemy, the line between 
absolute and conditional contraband was in any case indistinguishable." Julius Stone, Legal 
Controls of International Conflict (1954), pp. 481-2.. 
It is in any event clear that a belligerent has the right to draft its contraband regulations 
in accordance with the particular circumstances in which an armed conflict is being conducted. 
20 "'Continuous voyage' is where in order to obtain immunity during a part of its voyage 
to the enemy port, the vessel breaks its journey at a neutral intermediate port, the contraband 
being ostensibly destined there. At the neutral port, for appearance's sake it may unload and 
reload the same contraband cargo, but in any case it then proceeds with the cargo on the short-
ened span of its journey to the enemy port. The doctrine of continuous voyage prescribes that 
such a vessel and its cargo are to be deemed to have an enemy destination (and, therefore, to be 
liable to seizure) from the time she leaves her home port. Similarly, 'continuous transports' 
is where the guilty cargo is unloaded at the neutral port, and is then carried further to the 
enemy port or destination by another vessel or vehicle. The corresponding doctrine of con-
tinuous transports applies with similar effect, rendering the cargo liable to seizure from .the 
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time it leaves its home port." Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954), p. 486. 
The principles underlying the so-called doctrines of "continuous voyage" and "continuous 
transport'' were applied by prize courts in both World Wars I and II. 
21 The circumstances creating a presumption of ultimate enemy destination enumerated in 
subparagraphs 631c 1 and 2. are of concern to operating naval commanders for the reason that 
circumstances held to create a presumption of enemy destination constitute sufficient cause for 
capture. Before a prize court each of these presumptions is rebuttable and whether or not a 
prize court will, in fact, condemn the captured cargo, and vessel (or aircraft), will depend upon 
a number of complex considerations with which an operating naval commander need not be 
concerned. 
22 See Note 2.0 above. 
23 There are a number of methods available to belligerents for the control of contraband 
trade, in addition to the belligerent right to capture vessels and aircraft found carrying contra-
band. In World Wars I and II the two major techniques of contraband control, used princi-
pally by Great Britain, were "navicerting" and "rationing." 
"The term navicert (or letters of assurance) is applied to documents issued by officials of a 
belligerent state, indicating that the cargo of a vessel sailing from a neutral port corresponds 
to the manifest. Its purpose is to serve as a 'sort of commercial passport,' to facilitate the 
passage of the vessel and avoid the necessity of search of the cargo by the belligerent, but it 
does not convey any guaranty that the vessel and cargo will be free from seizure or inter-
ference." Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. 7 (1943), p. 2.12.. 
". . . it is clear that in its origin a navicert is simply a facility which the belligerent is not 
in any way obliged to afford and the grant or refusal of which in any given case he cannot be 
legally obliged to justify. Since the absence of a navicert is not in itself a ground for seizure 
or condemnation, and only entails the exercise of a contraband control which the belligerent 
in any case has an absolute legal right to exercise, the grant or refusal of any certificate on 
the basis of which the belligerent is prepared to forego or modify his strict rights, must 
legally be within his absolute discretion." G. G. Fitzmaurice, "Some Aspects of Modern 
Contraband Control and the Law of Prize,'' British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 2.2. 
(1945), p. 84. 
In practice a vessel covered by a navicert, in the absence of later suspicious circumstances, 
was normally considered free from capture. The important feature of the navicert system was 
that cargo examination was conducted in port before a voyage started. 
The technique of contraband control termed "rationing" has been explained as follows: 
"The idea underlying this process (i.e., rationing) expressed in a non-legal manner, is that 
it is only by limiting neutrals who have land communications with enemy territory to their 
own strict necessities in the matter of overseas imports that it is possible to ensure that no 
substantial proportion of these will reach the enemy. Failing that, however innocent many 
shipments may appear, or indeed be in themselves at the time, it is certain that some consid-
erable part of them, or of goods processed or manufactured from them, will find its way to 
the enemy. Put in legal terms, the foundation of a rationing system is that, where a neutral 
country is found to be importing greater quantities of any commodity on the contraband list 
than can be accounted for by its reasonable domestic needs, having regard to all the circum-
stances, including manufacture for export to innocent destination, a presumption arises 
that the surplus is going to the enemy." G. G. Fitzmaurice, "Some Aspects of Modern 
Contraband Control and The Law of Prize," British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXII 
(1945), p. 89. 
A system of rationing may either be the subject of an agreement between a neutral state and 
a belligerent, or may be imposed on a neutral by a belligerent. In practice, rationing systems 
have been instituted through agreement between neutral and belligerent. Rationing agree-
ments usually fix the annual amount of each rationed commodity to be imported and the specific 
procedure to be followed for licensing the agreed shipments. Shipments of commodities to a 
neutral state in excess of a quota agreed on by neutral and belligerent, or imposed by a bellig-
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erent on a neutral, have been considered as creating the presumption of ultimate enemy destina· 
tion and hence as justifying capture. However, before a British prize court this presumption 
may be rebutted. In neither World War were goods condemned by prize courts on "statistical 
evidence" alone. 
24 As an exception, British and American practices have allowed for the capture of a vessel 
which has already deposited contraband goods, if such goods were carried under simulated or 
false papers. 
25 See Notes 18 and 19 above. 
26 The provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Articles 2.3 and 59, cover the types of articles contemplated in this 
paragraph. 
27 Article 632. refers to blockade as a normal measure of naval warfare between belligerents. 
A blockade, in the sense of this article, should not be confused with a so-called "pacific block-
ade." 
28 The traditional rules governing the operation of blockade in naval warfare are, for the 
most part, customary in character. They received their definitive form during the nineteenth 
century. Although the general principle underlying the law of blockade has been defined 
as the right of a belligerent possessing effective command of the sea 
" ... to deprive his opponent of the use thereof for the purpose either of navigation by 
his own vessels or of conveying on neutral vessels such goods as are destined to or originate 
from him." (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. II (7th ed., 1952.), pp. 796-7.) 
the traditional rules governing the operation of blockade tended in fact to represent a compro-
mise between the above-mentioned claim by belligerents and the desire of neutral states to suffer 
the least possible interference in their trade with both belligerent and neutral states. The 
result of these conflicting clai~s was a system of rules designed to effect only a limited inter-
ference with neutral trade. In practice, these rules were at once the product of, and intended 
to regulate, inshore ("close-in") blockades; that is blockades maintained by a line of vessels 
stationed in the immediate vicinity of the blockaded coast. 
Recent developments in the weapons for waging warfare at sea have now rendered the in-
shore blockade exceedingly difficult and unlikely, save in exceptional circumstances (e. g., 
local or limited war). In addition, the increasing importance of measures directed against an 
enemy's economy has led to a strong emphasis by belligerents upon the complete abolition of 
an enemy's seaborne trade, an aim which normally is not furthered substantially by the estab-
lishment of blockades in strict conformity with the traditional rules. Hence, during World 
Wars I and II several of the major belligerents resorted to methods which, though frequently 
referred to as measures of blockade, could not easily be reconciled with the traditional rules 
governing blockade. In particular, the so-called "long distance" blockades of Germany by 
Great Britain departed in a number of respects from these traditional rules. The British 
Government chose to base the legality of these. so-called "long distance" blockades upon the 
belligerent right of retaliation against illegitimate acts of warfare rather than upon the right 
to establish blockade. 
29 However, the practical difficulties of visit and search of aircraft suspected of breach ot 
blockade (e. g., the absence of suitable landing places under belligerent control, etc.) ·may 
preclude such extension by analogy. See Chapter 5, Note 16, for application of U. S. prize 
law to aircraft. The commander of blockading forces should request instructions from higher 
authority regarding enforcement procedures to be followed in the case of a blockade extended 
to include the air space. 
30 A blockade also may be ordered by the Security Council of the United Nations pursuant 
to Article 42. of the Charter which states: 
"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action 
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may include demonstrations, blockade, and other other operations by a1r, sea or land 
forces of members of the United Nations." 
It i~ not possible to say whether, or to what extent, a United Nations blockade would be 
governed by the traditional rules. 
31 A blockade shall not be established by naval forces of the United States unless directed 
by the President. Although it is the customary practice of states when declaring a blockade 
to specify a period during which neutral vessels (and aircraft) may leave the blockaded area, 
there is no uniformity with respect to the length of the period of grace. A belligerent declaring 
a blockade is free to fix such a period of grace as it may consider to be reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
32 Because the requirement of knowledge of the existence of a blockade is an essential ele-
ment of the offenses of breach of blockade and attempted breach of blockade (see paragraph 
632.g), neutral vessels (and aircraft) are always entitled to notification. However, the specific 
form such notification may take is not material. 
33 The customary requirement that a blockade must be effective in order to be binding is 
intended to prevent a so-called "paper blockade"; that is, a declaration of a blockade by a 
belligerent that does not possess the power necessary to render the blockade effective. Origi-
nally intended to apply to the relatively restricted areas covered by (close-in) blockades, the 
requirement of effectiveness remains applicable to blockading forces that may operate at con-
siderable distances from an enemy's coasts. In particular, a belligerent cannot argue that the 
necessity of patrolling large areas excuses it from the requirement of effectively maintaining the 
blockade. -
The requirement of effectiveness does not preclude the temporary absence of the blockading 
force, if such absence is due to stress of weather or to some reason connected with the blockade, 
e. g., the chase of a blockade runner. Furthermore, a blockade ceases to be effective, and hence 
ceases to be binding, if the blockading force is driven away by the enemy, or if the blockading 
force leaves the blockaded area for reasons other than those stated above. 
There is no requirement that a blockade must prevent access to every portion of an enemy's 
coast in order to be effective. Nor need a blockade cover every possible approach to the ports 
of the blockaded coast. 
"'Effective,' in short, comes to mean sufficient to render capture probable under ordinary 
weather or other similar conditions. But even on this view, due no doubt to the fact that 
the lines of controversy were set before the rise of steampower, mines, or submarines, aircraft 
and wireless communication, at least one man-o-war must be present. Aircraft and sub-
marines, however, as well as mines, concrete blocks, or other sunken obstacles may be used 
as auxiliary to blockading surface vessel or vessels. How many surface vessels, with what 
speed and armament, are necessary, along with auxiliary means, and how close they must 
operate for effectiveness in view of the nature of the approaches to the blockaded port, are 
questions of nautical expertise in each case." Julius Stone, Legal Controls of Int~rnational 
Conflict (1954), p. 496. 
34 The rule that a blockade must not bar access to neutral ports and coasts should be inter-
preted to mean that a blockade must not prevent trade and communication to or from neutral 
ports or coasts, provided that such trade and communication is neither destined to nor originates 
from the blockaded area (see subparagraph 632.g (3)). It is a moot point to what extent 
conventions providing for free navigation on international rivers or through international 
canals have been respected by blockading states. The practice of states in this matter is far 
from clear (see paragraph 412.b). 
35 The requirement that a belligerent must apply a blockade impartially to the vessels and 
aircraft of all states is intended to prevent measures of .discrimination by the blockading bellig-
erent in favor of or against the vessels and aircraft of particular states, including its own or 
allied vessels and aircraft. 
36 A presumption of knowledge should be held to exist once a blockade has been declared 
and notified. 
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s7 See Note 2.1 above. 
as See subparagraphs 502.b2. and 3 for acts which when performed by a blockade runner render 
her liable to forcible measures. 
39 "Under the Anglo-American practice the word 'enemy' in this connection (i.e., as used 
to determine the character of goods or property) has a special meaning . . . It does not con-
note either enemy nationality or enemy sympathy. The test is commercial residence or 'domi-
cile,' which means that all those must be treated as enemies who carry on their business in 
the enemy country or in territory under enemy control. The reason for the rule is that the 
enemy economy is enriched by all trade that is carried on in his territory, and every profitable 
transaction increases his resources for waging war. Here, as elsewhere, the basic principle is 
that power at sea may lawfully be used to prevent any commerce which may assist the enemy 
in carrying on the war." H. A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (2.nd ed., 1950), p. 12.8. 
Although the enemy character of goods depends upon the enemy character of their owners, 
there are no universally accepted rules by which the enemy character of individuals may be 
determined. British and American practice has been to regard the commercial domicile of the 
owner as the criterion for determining enemy character, but many states have considered the 
nationality of the owner, irrespective of resident, to be the proper test for determining enemy 
character. 
40 Article 2. of the Declaration of Paris, 1856, generally considered as expressive of a rule of 
customary law, states: "The neutral flag covers enemy goods with the exception of contraband 
of war." 
This exception to the seizure of enemy goods becomes less significant in the light of recent 
developments in the law of contraband and the law of blockade (see Articles 631 through 633). 
41 The following provisions of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, annexed to Hague Convention No. IV (1907 ), are considered equally applicable to the 
conduct of naval warfare . 
.. Article 2.3, para. b. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions, it is 
especially forbidden to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile 
nation or army. 
"Article 2.4. Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining in-
formation about the enemy and the country are considered permissible." 
42 Legally permissible ruses include, but are not limited to, the following: surprises, feigned 
attacks; ambushes, retreats, or flights; simulation of quiet and inactivity, use of small units 
to simulate large units; transmittal of false or misleading messages or deception of the enemy 
by false instructions; utilization of the enemy's signals; deliberate planting of false information; 
and use of dummy ships, aircraft, airfields, and other installations. 
43 "The ruse which is of most practical importance in naval warfare is the use of the false 
flag. It now seems to be fairly well established by the custom of the sea that a ship is jus-
tified in wearing false colors for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, provided that she goes 
into action under her true colors. The celebrated German cruiser Emden made use of this strat-
agem in 1914 when she entered the harbour of Penang under Japanese colors, hoisted her 
proper ensign, and then torpedoed a Russian cruiser lying at anchor. It is equally permis-
sible for a warship to disguise her outward appearance in other ways and even to pose as a 
merchant ship, provided that she hoists the naval ensign before opening fire. Merchant 
vessels themselves are also at liberty to deceive enemy cruisers in this way." H. A. Smith, 
The Law and Custom of the Sea (2nd ed., 1950), p. 91. 
On the other hand, the attitude and practices of belligerents during World Wars I and II 
appear to indicate that belligerent military aircraft are not considered as permitted, by ar;talogy 
with warships, to use false markings in order to deceive an enemy. 
44 It is, for example, an act of treachery to make improper use of a flag of truce. 
45 See Articles 30, 34, 35, 41, and 45 of the 1949 Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. 
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